2018
Proceedings

Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law
May 17th, 9:20 AM - 9:55 AM

Detection and Recovery of Anti-Forensic (VAULT) Applications on
Android Devices
Michaila Duncan
Sam Houston State University, mbd015@shsu.edu

Umit Karabiyik
Sam Houston State University, umit@purdue.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Forensic Science and
Technology Commons, Information Security Commons, National Security Law Commons, OS and
Networks Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Duncan, Michaila and Karabiyik, Umit, "Detection and Recovery of Anti-Forensic (VAULT) Applications on
Android Devices" (2018). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 6.
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2018/presentations/6

This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

Detection and Recovery of Anti-Forensic (Vault) ...

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

DETECTION AND RECOVERY OF
ANTI-FORENSIC (VAULT)
APPLICATIONS ON ANDROID DEVICES
Michaila Duncan and Umit Karabiyik
Sam Houston State University
Department of Computer Science
Huntsville, TX, 77340
{mbd015, umit}@shsu.edu

ABSTRACT
A significant number of mobile device users currently employ anti-forensics applications,
also known as vault or locker applications, on their mobile devices in order to hide files
such as photos. Because of this, investigators are required to spend a large portion of their
time manually looking at the applications installed on the device. Currently, there is no
automated method of detecting these anti-forensics applications on an Android device. This
work presents the creation and testing of a vault application detection system to be used
on Android devices. The main goal of this work is twofold: (i) Detecting and reporting the
presence of various vault applications installed on given Android devices, and (ii) recovering
the files that are hidden by utilizing these vault applications. The testing of our system
was performed on six different devices running different versions of Android and in various
states of rootedness. The findings show that with a fairly comprehensive list of known
vault applications, it is possible to provide a list of the vault applications installed on the
Android device and possibly provide extracted hidden files to the investigator unless they
are encrypted. Hence, our work greatly reduces the amount of time that the investigators
are required to spend examining the applications on the device.
Keywords: mobile forensics, Android OS, anti-forensic, data hiding, vault applications

1.

INTRODUCTION

Mobile applications that enable users to
store their data securely are often referred
to as “vault” or “locker” applications. These
applications can look like vaults or lockers,
or they can imitate like other types of applications, such as calculators, media managers, or even stock managers. These vault
applications require the user to type in a certain passcode in order to access and view
c 2018 ADFSL

the data that is stored within them. There
are currently hundreds of these applications
available for download on the Google Play
Store (Google, 2018).
The hidden personal data in vault applications can be anything from photos, videos,
and documents to SMS/MMS messages, call
logs, and contacts and possibly other information, depending on the specific application being used (see an example in Figure 1).
Because these applications claim to offer a
Page 39
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higher level of security than the default storage options provided with the device, many
Android users have turned to these applications to store their data, whether their data
is harmless or illicit. Certainly many users,
including juveniles, are using these applications to store and hide illicit pictures and
videos of themselves or others.

123

log

Figure 1. Screenshots of an example vault
application, Calculator Vault, presenting its
calculator, password entry, and hiding capabilities.
In the past two years, there has been an
increase in the news of the number of police
investigations that involve these vault applications, particularly involving juveniles.
There have been news articles of cases
in Colorado (Eckholm, 2015), Connecticut (Oliveira, 2015), Kentucky (Millward,
2017), and Huntsville, Texas (Nunez, 2017).
In the criminal case in Huntsville, Texas, a
juvenile student sent a recording and nude
photos to another student who then sent
the recording and photos to many other students. Many of the students deleted the media upon receipt, but several of them kept
the media and stored it either in the default
location for media on their devices or within
a vault application installed on their devices.
When the authorities were conducting their
investigation, they found that they were required to manually examine every device in
order to ensure that none of the applications
Page 40

installed on the devices were vault applications that contained the illicit media.
Given that the challenges have risen in
the cases mentioned above, there are two
main goals of this research. The first goal
is to determine and report on the presence of vault applications on an Android
device and provide that information to investigators. This will allow investigators to
spend less time manually checking each application for hidden media, as well as increasing the probability that they will find
these vault applications at all due to the
fact that many of these applications look
to be harmless. At the time of writing,
there are at least 256 different vault applications available for download on the Google
Play Store. Cellebrite’s (Cellebrite, 2018)
digital forensics software is used by a large
number of law enforcement agencies including the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department
of Justice, and the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (Evans, 2016).
While Cellebrite’s softwares currently provide many features that allow investigators
to easily analyze the data acquired from mobile devices, one feature that Cellebrite’s
softwares are missing is reporting on the
presence of vault applications on the device
being acquired. Cellebrite softwares will provide a full list of the applications installed on
the device, but they do not inform the investigator about suspicious applications. Because this feature does not exist, investigators currently are required to manually view
the applications installed on the device to
determine if these applications are on the
device. The purpose of this work is to provide an automated method for investigators
to utilize in order to determine if any vault
applications exist on the device.
The Autopsy forensic suite is an open
source forensic suite of tools that has many
of the same capabilities as a commercial tool,
c 2018 ADFSL
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including mobile device forensics, but the
costs of an open source tool are marginal
compared to commercial tools, which makes
it desirable to users who do not have the
funds to purchase commercial software. Like
Cellebrite, Autopsy does not currently have
the capabilities to detect the presence of
vault applications on an Android device.
The second goal of this study is to retrieve any unencrypted media uploaded to
any vault applications found on the Android
device. Not every vault application encrypts
the data uploaded by the user. Because of
that fact, and because a major objective of
this project is to assist the investigator to
recover as much as possible, as many unencrypted images as possible are retrieved and
presented to the investigator in a separate
Images folder.
The rest of the paper presents related work
in Section 2 which is followed by the apparatus used in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the five-phase overarching methodology. The summary of findings is presented
in Section 5 and Section 6 describes the conclusions and future work for the project.

2. RELATED WORK
AND BACKGROUND
Related work in two major areas were reviewed. These two major areas are: Android
methods of acquisition, and Android AntiForensic.

2.1

Android Methods of
Acquisition

There are two commonly implemented methods of Android device data acquisition.
These two major methods are logical acquisition and physical acquisition. In addition
to these common methods, file system acquisition is another technique that is also used
to acquire data from mobile devices.
c 2018 ADFSL
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Logical extraction is an extraction that
stays within the confines of the file system
of the device. Oftentimes, the forensic software that is performing the logical acquisition of the data will load its own mobile application onto the device. For instance, the
Cellebrite UFED Forensics Software loads
a device-specific API (Application Programming Interface) to the device for acquisition.
After that, the API is used for read-only
requests for the data in the file system of
the device (Cellebrite, 2014). This method
typically will not retrieve any third party
or deleted data from the device; however,
this method of acquisition is easier for forensic tools to organize back into the file system format (Azadegan, Yu, Liu, Sistani, &
Acharya, 2012).
There are two principal types of logical acquisition: Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and
Android Backup. ADB is a free command
line utility included with the Android SDK
that allows for a selection of actions, anything from installing applications to acquiring information from the device (Android,
2017). The ADB method of extraction can
copy parts of the file system of the device.
If the device is not rooted (a method of attaining root access to the phone’s operating
system), the ADB method of acquisition will
only be selectively successful and only unencrypted app data, user data, and system information can be acquired from the device.
The investigator will need to enable the hidden Developer Options menu in order to enable the USB Debugging option for the ADB
acquisition method to work. If the device is
rooted, the ADB method will be able to extract nearly every file and folder found in the
file system of the device (Jovanovic & Redd,
2012). Android Backup acquisition occurs
when a backup of the device is created and
subsequently analyzed. This backup can be
initiated by the forensic software (such as
Cellebrite UFED Touch) at the time of exPage 41
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amination, or the backup could have been
made by the user at some point. This acquisition method retrieves little data, but even
retrieving little data is better than retrieving
no data at all (Cellebrite, 2015).
Physical acquisition is a method of acquisition in which a bit-by-bit copy of the device
is made for analysis. This type of acquisition
could potentially recover deleted data that is
not possible with logical acquisition.
There are several ways to perform physical data acquisitions, but only two types will
be discussed here: boot loader, and the Unix
command line utility “dd.” The boot loader
method of physical data acquisition is performed utilizing the download mode of the
device. While in this download mode, the
device allows the forensic software to install
a small chunk of code into the RAM of the
device that is to be run during the startup,
or boot-up, of the device (Cellebrite, 2014).
This chunk of code is able to read and obtain a copy of the memory. This copy of the
memory will then need to be interpreted by
a forensic software for analysis by the investigator (see Figure 2 (Cellebrite, 2014)).

~

I

Loads Forensic Acquisition Software t

Figure 2. A boot loader is uploaded to the
device that allows for the memory to be
transferred to the workstation for analysis.
The “dd” method of physical acquisition
utilizes the Unix and Unix-kernel operating
system command line utility “dd” to copy
files and folders, including copying an entire directory. For this reason, the “dd”
command can be employed to copy the entire directory of an Android device to an
Page 42

external storage location; however, in order to utilize the “dd” command, the device must be rooted, which means that access to the root directory of the device must
be granted (Lessard & Kessler, 2010). The
resulting file created is referred to as a “raw
image file” and can be decoded by most
forensic softwares.
File system acquisition method allows
making the copy of the file system of the device particularly allocated space. Although
unallocated space is not acquired with this
method, deleted file remnants might be identified using database files collected from the
file system of the device.

2.2

Android Anti-Forensic
Techniques

Anti-forensics was defined by Ryan Harris as
“any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence to the forensics process (Harris, 2006). There are four
common methods of anti-forensics in digital forensics: destroying evidence, hiding
evidence, eliminating evidence sources, and
counterfeiting evidence (Distefano, Me, &
Pace, 2010).
Destroying evidence means that the evidence has been completely eliminated and is
no longer retrievable. This does not mean
that the evidence was simply rendered inaccessible; it means that the evidence has
been completely obliterated, whether that
means that the evidence was overwritten by
reformatting the device, wiping the device,
or sanitizing the device. Reformatting the
device is often performed by overwriting all
of the ones and zeros that make up the data
of the device with all zeros and then restructuring the directory of the device. Wiping
the device is typically performed by overwriting the data one or more times with random data or by replacing all of the data with
zeros, similar to reformatting the device, but
c 2018 ADFSL
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without restructuring the directory. This
causes the data to be completely unrecoverable. Sanitizing the device can be done
by overwriting the data on the device with
random data (just like wiping the device, as
described above), or by physically destroying
the device (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003). This
method is out of the scope of this paper.
Hiding evidence is removing evidence from
plain view so the investigator will be less
likely to locate it. This is not always successful, but it has been found to be quite effective, especially if the evidence is placed in
a location the investigator is not likely to examine, such as in an application that looks
to be a simple calculator application from
the outside, or by renaming the file in order to avert suspicion (Harris, 2006). This
method plays on the fact that investigators
are human and are not able to check every
location on the device, or that the investigator may not have knowledge of the locations
in which information could be hidden. This
is the method of anti-forensics that is utilized by vault applications hence t0he target
of our research.
Eliminating evidence sources is a method
that does not destroy evidence. Instead, it
prevents evidence from being created. For
example, an Onion Router could be used in
order to prevent Internet traffic logs from being created while communicating on a public network (Syverson, Reed, & Goldschlag,
2000).
Counterfeiting evidence is a method of
anti-forensics that creates a fake collection of
evidence that is meant to look like something
it is not. This method of anti-forensics is
meant to trick the digital forensics tools and
the investigator working with the data into
believing something that is not true (Harris,
2006).
Last two anti-forensics methods are also
out of the scope of this paper.
c 2018 ADFSL
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3.

APPARATUS

This section outlines the apparatus used in
the testing of this project. All the Android
devices that are utilized in this research are
shown with their Android OS version and
rooting options in Table 1. The initial Android device used when installing the vault
applications was a Huawei Premia 4G M931
mobile phone running Android kernel version 3.0.21-perf. The service provider was
MetroPCS, but there was no SIM card installed in the device. The total storage available on the device was 2.28GB total internally with 2.15GB of the internal memory
available for utilization by the user. An 8GB
MicroSD card was installed into the device
for additional storage. The device was successfully provided root privileges using Framaroot APK and USB debugging mode was
enabled. Full root privileges, which is considered to be the automatic possessing of administrator level privileges at the command
prompt startup, were enabled by installing
ADBD Insecure on the device.
A secondary Android device was also used
for additional testing of the program. This
secondary device was a LG LS840 Viper
mobile phone running Android kernel version 3.0.8. The service provider was Sprint,
but there was no SIM card installed in
the device. The total storage available on
the device was 1.73GB total internally with
0.97GB of the internal memory available for
use by the user. A 16GB MicroSD card was
installed into the device for additional storage. The device was successfully provided
root privileges using SRSRoot and USB debugging mode was enabled. Full root privileges were enabled by installing ADBD Insecure on the device. The third device, LG
Nexus 5, was used for testing as well. It
was rooted using CF-Auto-Root and USB
debugging mode was enabled. Full secure
root privileges could not be enabled on this
Page 43
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Table 1. Mobile devices used in experiments.
Mobile Device

Android version

Root Option

Huawei Premia 4G M931
4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Rooted
LG LS840 Viper
4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Rooted
LG Nexus 5
6.0.1 (Marshmallow)
Rooted
Samsung Galaxy Rush SPH-M830 4.1.2 (Jelly Bean)
Unrooted
Motorola Photon Q XT897
4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Unrooted
Huawei Prism U8651T
2.3.6 (Gingerbread)
Unrooted
device.
A workstation running Linux Ubuntu was
utilized. Tools configured on the workstation included Android Debug Bridge (ADB),
Python version 2.7.12, Android Studio version 2.3.3, and an SQLite browser. A workstation running Windows 10 was also utilized. Tools configured on this workstation
included Cellebrite UFED Reader version
6.2.0.79, and Autopsy forensic suite version
4.3.0. Additionally, a workstation running
Windows 7 with OpenText’s EnCase Software version 7.10 was utilized.

4.

METHODOLOGY

In order to verify the presence of vault applications on an Android device and to retrieve
the media stored within those applications,
the development and testing of this research
was divided into five phases: scenario creation, list creation, device analysis, program
creation, and program testing.

4.1

Scenario Creation

The purpose of this phase was to simulate
actual user data on the Android device. To
begin with, eight different vault applications
were installed on the Huawei Premia 4G
M931. These applications were chosen at
random from the list of 256 vault applications. A list of these applications can be seen
in Table 2. The eighth application, Smart
Hide Calculator (com.ids.smartcalculator)
Page 44

was initially installed on the device, but the
application was not operational; therefore,
the application was subsequently removed
from the device.
Table 2. Eight initial vault applications installed on the initial rooted Android device
* Application removed from device because it was nonfunctional

Application Name

Package Name

Audio Manager
Calculator Private Photo
Video Locker
Calculator Vault
Gallery Lock
Keep Your Media Safe
Photo Locker
Vault Hide
Smart Hide Calculator*

com.hideitpro
secret.hide.calculator
com.calculator.vault
com.morrison.gallerylocklite
it.ideasolutions.kyms
com.handyapps.photoLocker
com.netqin.ps
com.ids.smartcalculator*

After the application setup, ten different
photos with the file extension “.jpg” were uploaded into each application, and no two applications received the same photos as any
other application. No videos were uploaded.

4.2

List Creation

During this phase of the project, a list was
created containing applications currently on
the Google Play Store available for download. This list was created by performing several different searches on the Google
Play Store with keywords such as “Vault”,
“Locker,” and “Hide Media.” For each application that matched the query, details of
c 2018 ADFSL
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the application, such as the full application
name, the package name, and the developer
name. An approximate size of the application was acquired by using a third-party
website called Appbrain (AppBrain, 2018).
In total, 256 different applications were entered into the list with room to add more in
the future.

4.3

Device Analysis

During this phase, the Huawei Premia 4G
M931 was analyzed in order to determine a
course of action for the next phase of the
project, which is program creation. This
phase consisted of acquiring the data from
the device and analyzing it to see what data
was extracted from the applications installed
on the device and where that data was located on the device.
The acquisition process began by utilizing
a Cellebrite UFED Touch terminal. A physical acquisition, a logical acquisition, and
a file system acquisition of the device was
performed and each data extraction was analyzed with UFED Reader, which was installed on the Windows 10 workstation.
Table 3. Number of images acquired by each
acquisition method
Acquisition Method

Number of Images

Physical Acquisition
Logical Acquisition
File System Acquisition

1700
600
1300

Table 3 describes the number of images acquired from the device by each data acquisition method. While examining the images
located during the three acquisitions, it was
determined that several of the images were
located in some of the data folders associated
with the anti-forensics applications installed
on the device. Images being found in these
folders indicates that these applications do
not perform any kind of advanced hiding
c 2018 ADFSL

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

techniques, and instead merely remove the
images from their original location.
An additional physical acquisition of the
device was performed by using the Unix
command line utility “dd.” This device acquisition was performed with the guideline
provided in (Lohrum, 2018). The acquisition was examined using Autopsy Forensic
Suite installed on the Windows 10 workstation. The examination revealed that
several of the images that had been initially placed onto the 8GB MicroSD Card
and subsequently deleted were recovered by
Autopsy. All of these images were the
images uploaded to the application Audio Manager (com.hideitpro). Additional
images were also located in the acquisition of the device. These images were
not previously deleted, but were instead
merely moved to a new location of the
device storage by their respective applications. These images were the images uploaded to the applications Calculator Vault
(com.calculator.vault), Calculator Private
Photo Video Locker (secret.hide.calcualtor),
Gallery Lock (com.morrison.gallerylocklite),
and Vault Hide (com.netqin.ps). No additional images were located in the acquisitions
that were useful to our work.
The Unix command line utility “dd” physical acquisition was examined using OpenText’s EnCase Forensic Software (just before
the time of the writing of this paper, Guidance Software, the original creator of EnCase
Forensic Software, was merged with OpenText (OpenText, 2018)). The results of that
examination were the same as those from the
Autopsy Forensic Suite examination.
The information that was gathered from
analyzing these acquisitions was useful in the
creation of the program to determine the
presence of anti-forensics applications. It
was also helpful in order to potentially retrieve the data that was stored by the antiforensics application.
Page 45
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Program Creation

This program is built with the Python programming language. It compares the package names of the applications installed on
the device to the package names in the list
created previously. If any of these package
names are confirmed matches, the program
flags that application by writing the application’s name and package name to a text file,
and attempts to recover any of the images
hidden by each application.
.@ubuntu : ~/VuultAppDctcct S adb shell
root@androld:/ #
root@androld:/ # exlt

Figure 3. A fully rooted device has full
root privileges at the initial command line
prompt.
It was found that vault applications could
be detected on three different types of Android devices: fully rooted, semi-rooted, and
unrooted devices. Fully rooted devices are
devices that have full root (administrator)
privileges, even at the initial command line
prompt (Figure 3). Semi-rooted devices are
devices that are rooted, but an additional
command must be executed to receive full
root privileges at the command line prompt
(Figure 4). Unrooted devices are devices
that have no root privileges at all (Figure
5).
@ubuntu : ~/VuultAppDctcct $ adb shell
shell@haMMerhead:/ S su
root@haMMerhead:/ #
root@haMMerhead:/ # exlt
shell haMMerhead: S exlt

Figure 4. A semi-rooted device is rooted, but
an additional command must be executed to
receive full root privileges at the command
line prompt.
Because fully rooted devices are the most
likely devices to produce the most data, a
large amount of time was spent developing a
Page 46

@ubuntu : ~/VuultAppDctcct S adb shell
shell@asantt_c : / S su
/systeM/bln/sh : su: not found
127lshell@asantl_c:/ S exlt

Figure 5. An unrooted device has no root
privileges.
way to successfully acquire as much information as possible from the vault applications
installed on this type of device. With experimentation, it was discovered that the most
reliable way to detect the applications and
collect data from them would be to use the
following command:
adb pull /data/data/<Package_Name>/
The ADB command above will allow to
access the application data files and acquire
the data contained in them. This command
copies the data file of an application if the
package name of that application is the same
as the package name of any application in the
vault application list that was created previously. The copy of the data file is placed
into the user-specified case directory that
is placed in the original program directory.
Once all of the relevant data directories are
copied, the program looks for files within the
directories that have the file extension of either “.jpg” or “.png” and copies those files to
a separate Images directory within the userspecified case directory. As depending solely
on the extension of a might be misleading,
our tools also checks the header individual
files for magic numbers (hexadecimal value
of known file types). For example, if the
first two bytes of the file header is 0xFFD8,
then the file is marked as JPEG file, and
if the first four bytes of the file header is
0x89504E47, then the file is marked as PNG
file.
Once as many data files as possible are recovered and copied to the Images directory
in the user-specified case directory, the package names associated with each of the data
directories and its common application name
c 2018 ADFSL
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are copied into a text file to be reviewed by
“.png” files and moving them to the Images
the investigator later in the event that the
directory of the user-specified case directory.
investigator decides that they would like to
Many of the vault applications, such as
manually review the applications either on
Gallery Lock and Gallery Lock Lite, modify
the device or with a separate forensic softthe data uploaded to the applications in orware, such as Cellebrite or Autopsy.
der to circumvent attempts at recovering the
data. However, many of these applications
Semi-rooted devices are rooted and still
do not encrypt the data, but instead merely
have access to the data files of the device,
change the file extension. Gallery Lock and
but the command that was used for the
Gallery Lock Lite both perform this type of
fully rooted devices will not work for the
data hiding by changing the file extension
semi-rooted devices because the administrato “.glk.” The vault detection program is
tor permissions are not immediately accesprogrammed to know that these two applisible. Therefore, an alternative method was
cations should have this modified data and
used to detect the presence of vault applicatherefore searches specifically for that data
tions on this type of device. To begin with,
when it encounters these applications. Sevthe command
adb shell "su -c ‘ls /data/data >
eral applications that store their data simi/sdcard/Information/<FileName>.txt’"larly to Gallery Lock and Gallery Lock Lite
was employed to compile as list of the packare specially accounted for and the vault deage names of the vault applications installed
tection program is able to acquire their files
on the device. Once the package names
as well. These files that have a modified file
of the applications are collected, they are
extension are typically still viewable using a
placed into a text file along with the comstandard image viewing application, so the
mon application name for the investigator
program merely copies those files to the Imto review later. The text file is saved to the
age directory in the user-specified case diuser-specified case directory in the program
rectory in order to keep the integrity of the
directory. This text file is then used with the
file intact. Additionally, many vault applicacommand
tions attempt to hide their data by placing
adb shell "su -c ‘cp -R /data/data/
the data on the device’s SD Card. The vault
<PackageName>/sdcard/Information/’")detection program is able to search specifiThis command copies the package’s data dically for the data of several of those applicarectory from the device’s internal storage to
tions as well.
the SD card installed to the device. That
Zhang et al.
(Zhang, Baggili, & Bredata directory can then be copied from the
itinger, 2017) outline their work analyzing
device to the user-specified case directory by
and recovering data from the eighteen most
utilizing the command
popular vault applications available on the
adb pull /sdcard/Information/<Pkg_Name>Google Play Store. This paper was useful
Both of the commands above together are
in determining the different locations that a
able to get around the fact that the device is
vault application can potentially use to store
only semi-rooted and requires an extra comthe uploaded images and possibly where any
mand in order to access full root capabilities.
plaintext passwords to unlock the applicaOnce the relevant data files are moved
tion could be stored on the device. Their
to the user-specified directory, the program
work also provided useful information on apfollows the same procedure as that of the
plications that change the file extension of
fully rooted devices by looking for “.jpg” and
the uploaded data.
c 2018 ADFSL
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Table 4. Eleven additional applications and their associated package names installed to the
Huawei Premia M931
Application Name

Package Name

Timer Lock - Photo Video Hide
Hide App, Private Dating, Safe Chat - PrivacyHider
SCalc Free
QuickPic - Photo Gallery with Google Drive Support
Magic Box (Hidden photos)
Photo Shield - Hide Photos and Videos
Pandora
Photo Gallery (Fish Bowl)
Hide Files - Andrognito
Multi Account - Secure Storage
Undershare Photo Gallery Lock

krk.timerlock.timervault
com.trigtech.privateme
com.luca1897.scalc.free
com.alensw.PicFolder
cn.menue.photohider.international
com.genie9.glock
since2006.apps.pandora
com.littlefatfish.photo
com.codexapps.andrognito
com.reny.securespaceaccount
com.minichief.undershare.viewer

Unrooted devices are more difficult to analyze because the data contained on this type
of device is more protected than the data on
the other two types of devices. Therefore,
the program is unable to acquire the data
directories of these devices. However, vault
applications can still be detected on this type
of device and the names of these applications
can still be provided to the investigator for
the investigator to review the applications
manually.
In order to detect the vault applications,
we utilized the following command:
adb shell pm list packages
This command lists all of the packages installed on the device. The output of this
command was directed to a text file and
the contents of that text file were compared
against the data contained in the list of vault
applications created previously. If any of the
package names from the device match the
package name of an application in the list,
that package name and the common application name are placed into a separate text
file for the investigator to review later.
For the program to know which set of
commands to use on the device, it takes in
user input at runtime. This input is an opPage 48

tion that is either “r,” “-s,” or “u.” The
“-r” option selection dictates that the program should execute the fully rooted device
commands. The “-s” option selection designates that the program should implement
the semi-rooted device commands. The “u” option selection means that the program
should execute the unrooted device commands.

4.5

Testing and Preliminary
Results

Huawei Premia 4G M931: Program
testing began with the initial seven applications installed on the first rooted Android
device. After the program was successful
in locating, listing, and acquiring any data
associated with these installed vault applications placed on the device, an additional
eleven applications were installed on the first
rooted Android device. Table 4 lists the
names and package names of the eleven applications installed to the device. After the
application installation and setup, ten different photos with the file extension “.jpg” were
uploaded into each application, and no two
applications received the same photos as any
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other application. No videos were uploaded.
The device was fully rooted, so the program was not only able to detect the vault
applications installed on the device, but was
also able to recover some of the images that
were uploaded to the applications. The program was able to recover all of the images
from seven of the vault applications that
were installed on the device. It was also able
to recover some of the images from three of
the other applications.
LG Viper LS840: After testing the first
rooted Android device, the second fully
rooted Android device was used for testing. Ten different vault applications were installed on the device. It was discovered that
one of the applications, Ultimate Calculator
Hide (com.chiragnew.HIDEcalculator ) was
not functional therefore it was subsequently
removed from the device. After the initial
setup for each of the applications, ten different photos with the files extension “.jpg”
were uploaded into each application, and no
two applications received the same photos as
any other application. No videos were uploaded. Table 5 lists the names and packages names of the applications installed to
the device, including the application that
was removed from the device due to being
non-functional.
Similar to the Huawei Premia, the LG
Viper was also fully rooted. Therefore, the
vault detection program was able to not only
obtain the names of the vault applications
installed on the device, but it was also able
to recover some of the images that were uploaded to the vault applications.
The program was able to detect all nine of
the installed vault applications on the device
and was able to recover all of the files from
one of the applications installed on the device. Our program was also able to retrieve
some of the images from two additional vault
applications installed on the device.
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LG Nexus 5: Testing of the program’s
semi-rooted device vault detection capabilities was performed using the LG Nexus 5.
The program was able to detect and obtain
data from the installed vault applications
and was able to compile the names of these
applications into a text file. Table 6 lists the
application names and their associated package names of the vault applications installed
to the device.
The program was able to detect all ten of
the installed vault applications on the device and was able to recover all of the files
from three of the vault applications installed
on the device. The vault detection program
was also able to acquire images from two additional vault applications installed on the
device.
Unrooted Devices: Each of the three unrooted devices (Samsung Galaxy Rush, Motorola Photon Q, and Huawei Prism) were
tested against the program to test the capabilities of detecting vault applications on unrooted devices. Ten vault applications were
installed on the Samsung Galaxy Rush (see
Figure 7) and the Motorola Photon (see Figure 8) devices. Only seven applications were
installed on the Huawei Prism (see Figure 9)
device due to lack of storage available on the
device. Ten unique photos were uploaded to
each of the applications on all three of the
devices.
The vault detection program was able to
detect all twenty-seven applications installed
on the devices and placed each application
name and package name into a text file for
the investigator to review later. Nevertheless, our system was not able to recover any
hidden files from any of those vault applications because the vault applications keep
hidden files located under /data/data directory which is not accessible without root
privileges.
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Table 5. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the LG Viper
LS840
*Application removed from device because it was non-functional

Application Name

Package Name

Folder Lock
com.newsoftwares.folderlock v1
Pic Lock- Hide Photos & Videos
com.xcs.piclock
A+ Gallery Photos & Videos
com.atomicadd.fotos
Private Zone - AppLock & Vault
com.leo.appmaster
Secret Gallery
com.kts.secret.gallery
Calculator Photo & Video Vault
com.yptech.privategallery
Ultimate Calculator Hide*
com.chiragnew.HIDEcalculator*
Hide Images Videos And Files
com.alpha.filehider
Vault : Hide Pictures Videos Gallery & Files com.gamemalt.vault
Calculator Lock - Private Photo hide
com.calculatorlock
Table 6. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the LG Nexus 5

5.

Application Name

Package Name

Applock
Hide Pictures & Videos - Vaulty
Hide Pictures PhotoSafe Vault
Gallery lock : Photo Lock
Hide Pictures Gallery Vault
Secret AppLock
VaultDroid - Calculator Vault
Hide Photos
Gallery
Hide Something - Photo, Video

com.domobile.applock
com.theronrogers.vaultyfree
com.slickdroid.vaultypro
sunstarphotomedia.photolockerpro
com.mallow.hidepicturesgalleryvault
com.amazing.secreateapplock
com.vaultdroid.calculatorhidephoto
com.domobile.hidephotos
com.threestar.gallery
com.colure.app.privacygallery

SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS

From the case studies with the different devices and a total of sixty-four applications,
it is determined that 100% of the vault applications can be detected, even on unrooted
devices. On fully rooted and semi-rooted devices, it is possible to not only detect 100%
of the applications, but it is also possible to
recover hidden files that were uploaded to
the vault applications by the user. The vault
detection program was able to recover unencrypted images, particularly if those images
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were stored in the data directory of the application on the device.
While this program was mostly only able
to acquire the unencrypted files associated
with the vault applications, more advanced
forensic programs designed to acquire and
decrypt images may be able to acquire the
additional images that this program was unable to obtain. This vault detection tool’s
primary goal was to detect whether vault
applications were present on an Android device and recover as many hidden files as possible. Our testing and preliminary results
show that our program is able to recover
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Table 7. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the Samsung
Glaxy Rush
Application Name

Package Name

Photo & Video Locker - Vault
Folder & File Locker, Hide Picture,Video Vault Pro
Secret Lock
Calculator Vault
Joy Gallery - lock, hide, good
Secret Photo Hide -Photo Vault
Calculator Plus Gallery Vault Photo Video Locker
Photo Vault Hide Pictures And Videos -KeepSecret
Photo Locker - Hide Pictures and Videos
File Hidder - Hide Image & Video

inno.gallerylocker
gallery.locker
jacob.secret.lock
carol.calculator.calculatorvault
com.threebillion.joygallery
com.photovault
com.calculatorhide.calculatorgallerylockvault
com.arcapps.keepsafe
itianz.photolocker
org.ccc.pb

Table 8. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the Motorola
Photon Q
Application Name

Package Name

Gallery Vault - Hide Pictures And Videos com.thinkyeah.galleryvault
Safe Gallery (Media Lock)
ukzzang.android.gallerylocklite
Secure Gallery(Pic/Video Lock)
com.sp.smartgallery.free
Vault - Hide Pictures & Videos
net.newsoftwares.folderlockadvanced
Photo Locker
com.rand.photolocker
Photo & Video (Gallery) Lock
com.os.photo.video.gallery.lock
Calculator Vault
me.lam.calculatorvault
Hide Photos
com.domobile.hidephotos
Ami Album-Hide photos & videos
com.gionee.freya.gallery
Calculator-Gallery Locker
in.ssdevelopers.security
Table 9. Seven applications and their associated package names installed to the Huawei
Prism
Application Name

Package Name

Hide Pictures Keep Safe Vault
AppLock
LOCX Applock Lock Apps & Photo
Image Locker -Hide your photos
Smart Hide Calculator
Super Vault - hide pictures
Hide photos/videos - iLock Neo

com.kii.safe
com.domobile.applock
com.cyou.privacysecurity
com.inno.imagelocker
com.ids.smartcalculator
com.hideimagevideo.supervault
com.capacus.neo
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100% of the apps and also able to recover
and reconstruct significant number of hidden
files with matched hash values.

6.

LIMITATIONS

Although our work shows outstanding success recovering vault applications, we are
also aware of some limitations. First, the
targeted mobile device screen must be unlocked and USB debugging mode must be
enabled. However, because this is likely not
the only tool an investigator will be employing in order to analyze the device, it is likely
that he or she has physical access to the
device and is able to put the device into
an unlocked state and enable the USB debugging capabilities. Needless to say that,
other commercial tools such as Cellebrite
also require the phones being unlocked and
USB debugging mode activated. Second,
this study only focused on Android applications available on the Google Play Store.
There are other, third-party locations from
which a user can download additional applications. Third, the Google Play Store is constantly changing; additional applications are
being uploaded every day. The current list of
vault applications created for this work will
require updating on a regular basis for the
program to continue to work properly. However, it is recommended that none of the entries to the list are ever removed, even if the
application no longer exists on the Google
Play Store, because it is possible for a user
to continue to use an application even after its removal from the Google Play Store.
Fourth, this work was only tested on devices
running Android operating system versions
2.3.6 to 6.0.1. Anything older or newer was
not tested, and it is unknown if the program
will work on any other versions. Lastly, this
work is limited only to Android vault and
locker applications and did not take into account other mobile operating systems, such
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as iOS and Windows.

7.

CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK

As shown from the results, it is possible to
detect vault applications on an Android device and recover their hidden files. It is also
significantly helpful to present the findings
to the investigator in an easy-to-understand
manner by using a list of known vault applications. Our proof of concept design shows
the possibility of these objectives. As part of
the future work, we plan acquiring and decrypting the encrypted data created by vault
applications for presentation to the investigator. We also would like to extend our work
to all other file types and information hidden. We also believe that the future work
should also examine the possibility of detecting vault applications on iOS devices. Lastly,
work should explore the feasibility of creating a graphical user interface to provide additional ease-of-use for the investigator.
As part of our efforts to support open
source forensic tools community and to allow future research opportunities, our source
code used in this work is available upon request and also publicly shared at http://
www.shsu.edu/uxk006/resources.html.
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